Procurement
bias, weak testing ecosystems, absent technical ownership, and a misaligned
R&D and funding architecture are the key lessons India must draw from the
evolution of the U.S. and Chinese military-industrial complexes.
India’s
defense modernization debate is often reduced to budgets, political will, or
bureaucratic delay. These explanations are incomplete. The deeper problem lies
in how the Indian armed forces conceptualize procurement, how little
technical ownership they retain over execution, and how funding authority is
fragmented away from engineering reality.
A
comparison with both the United States and China shows
that India’s constraint is not money or talent, but institutional
design—especially who controls programs once they begin.
1.
Procurement Philosophy: Build, Commit, Fix Vs Buy, Test, Delay
The
US Model: Commitment Is a Decision, Not a Reward
The United
States Armed Forces do not wait for perfection before committing.
They commit first and correct later.
The
sequence is consistent:
- Define
threat
- Commit
to a domestic solution
- Place
large, long-term orders early
- Field
imperfect systems
- Fix
and evolve them in service
The United
States Department of Defense optimizes for sovereignty, scale,
and ecosystem survival, not lowest unit cost (L1).
F-35
vs Tejas Mk1: Commitment Creates Capability
The
contrast between F-35 Lightning II and Tejas Mk1 is
illustrative.
The
F-35 entered service with software instability, reliability issues, and cost
overruns—yet the US and partners placed hundreds of orders upfront.
Production scaled before maturity. Problems were solved after induction,
not used as reasons to delay it.
Tejas
Mk1 followed the opposite path:
- Limited
initial orders
- Stop-start
commitment even after IOC/FOC
- Induction
treated as a reward for perfection
Capability
matures at scale, not in endless trials. The US understands this
structurally. India does not.
2.
Testing Infrastructure: Capability Is Decided Here, Not on Paper
US
Armed Forces: Testing Is a Military Asset
In
the US, testing infrastructure is owned, funded, and prioritised by the
armed forces themselves:
- Flight
test centers
- Engine
and propulsion test beds
- Weapons
integration labs
- EW
and environmental ranges
“Failures
feed redesign, not rejection. Operators, testers, engineers, and program
managers operate as one technical loop”.
China:
Infrastructure First, Platforms Later
The People’s
Liberation Army internalised this lesson early.
Before
demanding results, China:
- Built
engine and materials test infrastructure
- Invested
heavily in metallurgy and manufacturing
- Created
integrated flight-test ecosystems
Platforms
followed infrastructure—not the other way around.
India:
Expecting Outcomes Without Tools
India’s
experience—most starkly with engines—shows the cost of ignoring this logic.
The Kaveri
engine, led by Gas Turbine Research Establishment, was pursued
without:
- Heavy
thermal and hydraulic forge presses
- A
timely Flying Test Bed
- High-altitude
engine test facilities
- A
mature materials ecosystem
Testing
gaps were treated as DRDO or vendor failures—not as user-owned
capability gaps.
3.
Technical Ownership and the Missing CTO-Style Authority
The
US: Technical Authority Controls Money
A
critical but underappreciated difference is who controls funding during
execution.
In
the US system:
- Congress
authorises and appropriates funds
- The
DoD Comptroller apportions money
- Acquisition
leadership controls execution
Within
the United States Department of Defense:
- The
Under Secretary for Acquisition & Sustainment sets acquisition
direction
- Program
Executive Officers (PEOs) control
portfolios (fighters, engines, ships)
- Program
Managers (PMs) control
day-to-day spending
Crucially, funding
follows engineering judgement, not committee comfort. When problems
emerge, money is re-aligned—not withdrawn.
This
functions as a CTO-style model with budget authority.
Why
US Programs Survive Failure
This
structure explains why US programs:
- Receive
large upfront orders
- Survive
early failures (F-35, Aegis, Zumwalt)
- Are
fixed after induction, not abandoned
Once
the US commits, withdrawal is institutionally difficult. The system
is designed to fix problems, not escape them.
India:
Fragmented Authority, No Owner
India
has the opposite structure:
- Users
define requirements but don’t control funds
- MoD
controls funds but not technical execution
- DRDO
develops but cannot assure induction
- DPSUs
execute without competitive pressure
- Private
industry carries risk without authority
- Imports become a default setting when a program get delayed due to absence of ownership.
No
single entity:
- Owns
outcomes end-to-end
- Can
dynamically reallocate funding
- Can
protect a program through early failure
This
is why programs slow down, infrastructure is delayed, and imports become the
default escape.
4.
The Missing R&D Investment Strategy: Why an Extra 0.5% of GDP Matters
India
spends ~0.7% of GDP on R&D. An additional 0.5% of GDP on R&D that translates
to $20bn, even for a few years, would be transformational only if directed
towards National R&D misiions like engines with structural reform.
Done
right, it would:
- Accelerate
existing programs (Engines, AMCA, TEDBF, Naval systems)
- Build
shared infrastructure once for multiple platforms
- Enable
parallel solutions instead of sequential risk-avoidance
- Expand
priorities into civil aviation and transport aircraft
The
US and China widened their portfolios after stabilizing funding and
authority. India has done neither.
5.
Execution Model: Why Industry Must Lead
For
this R&D expansion to work, execution must be private-industry-led,
not dominated by DPSUs or government labs.
This
is not a critique of individuals in DRDO. It is recognition
of systemic limits of government execution:
- Risk
aversion
- File-driven
decision-making
- Inability
to iterate fast
- Fear
of visible failure
No
country has built jet engines, combat aircraft, or complex weapons through
government labs alone.
Correct
roles:
- Private
industry:
system integration, productization, scaling
- Armed
forces:
capability ownership and technical decisions
- DRDO: high-risk research, testing,
certification
- DPSUs: competitive production and
sustainment
This
mirrors the US MIC ecosystem and China’s state-directed primes.
Conclusion:
India’s Problem Is Not Spending — It Is Unity of Purpose and Control
The
United States commits early and fixes later. China commits ruthlessly and
scales fast. India waits for perfection—and imports when patience runs out.
At
the heart of this failure is a deeper contradiction.
Those
who take risks reap the rewards of their actions—but risk in national
defense is not borne by the military alone. The scientific and
engineering community takes equally consequential risks, often over
decades, in environments of uncertainty, incomplete data, and evolving threats.
Technology is not an accessory to national defense; it is one of its most
powerful instruments.
If both the scientific community and the armed forces
serve the same purpose—protecting the nation—then the persistent lack of
harmony between these two pillars becomes impossible to justify.
In India, success is often claimed collectively, but
failure is frequently isolated and assigned—usually downward. Scientists
are blamed for delays, industry is blamed for immaturity, while the user
quietly exits to imports. This dynamic destroys trust, discourages risk-taking,
and guarantees technological dependence.
No
serious military power functions this way.
In
the US and China, scientists, engineers, industry, and the armed forces
share both failure and success. Programs are protected through setbacks.
Accountability exists—but it is collective, not selective. This
unity of purpose is what allows systems like the F-35 to mature, engines to
evolve, and industries to scale in US and China.
India
must internalize this lesson.
Our scientists and soldiers are not opposing
camps—they are co-owners of national security outcomes. They must share
responsibility for both failure and success. Without that shared
accountability, no increase in R&D spending, no procurement reform, and no
organizational restructuring will deliver sovereignty.
Until
India:
- Unifies
technical and operational risk
- Aligns
funding authority with engineering judgement (Milestone based like DoD,
US)
- Commits
at scale and protects programs through failure
- Treats
technology creators as partners, not vendors
…the
cycle of delay, blame, and import dependence will continue.
"This
is not a question of budgets or capability. It is a question of institutional
trust, shared risk, and collective ownership".
“That
unity—of effort, respect, and accountability—must be the path forward”.
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